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11.1   Introduction
China often receives attention both for its rapidly growing trade and its 
serious environmental degradation. China’s trade with the world has risen 
dramatically between 1995 and 2005. In current dollars, the value of China’s 
exports plus imports rose from $280.9 billion in 1995 to $1422.1 billion in 
2005—a growth of about 406 percent. While improvements have been made 
in water and air quality over the same period, China’s Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection (MEP) stated that “[t]he confl ict between environment 
and development is becoming ever more prominent. Relative shortage of 
resources, a fragile ecological environment and insuﬃcient environmental 
capacity are becoming critical problems hindering China’s development” 
(MEP 2006).
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1. The evidence on the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve is mixed and highly 
dependent upon time period, countries evaluated, and pollutants examined. Thus, there is no 
way to verify whether or not China is to the left or right of the turning point in the “inverted 
U.” For surveys covering the broader literature on trade and environment, see Dean (2001) and 
Copeland and Taylor (2004).
2. In addition, some would argue that increased FDI would imply greater environmental 
degradation, as fi rms in pollution- intensive industries may move to avoid more stringent envi-
ronmental regulations at home. See Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009) for review of evidence and 
counterargument.
3. See Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001) for discussion of the causes of fragmentation.
4. Chinese trade statistics record two types of processing imports and exports: processing 
and assembly (where the foreigner retains ownership of imported inputs) and processing with 
imported inputs (where the importer acquires ownership of imported inputs).
5. Chinese trade statistics record several types of FIEs: fully- funded enterprises (i.e., wholly 
owned subsidiaries of foreign companies), equity joint ventures, and contractual joint ventures.
Some of  the large literature on trade and environment lends credence 
to the idea that trade growth and environmental degradation are causally 
related. The environmental Kuznets curve literature suggests that low- income 
countries have relatively lenient environmental standards and, hence, a com-
parative advantage in pollution- intensive goods.1 As a low- income country 
grows, environmental damage increases due to increased scale of produc-
tion and a composition of output biased toward “dirty goods.” However, 
higher incomes also generate pressure for more stringent environmental 
regulations. Because tighter regulations raise the cost of polluting and give 
producers incentives to fi nd cleaner production techniques, this tends to 
reduce environmental damage.2 For low- income countries, the scale and 
composition eﬀects are thought to outweigh the technique eﬀect, implying 
that the net eﬀect of  growth is detrimental to the environment. Because 
trade growth raises incomes, it, too, contributes to these scale, composition, 
and technique eﬀects. Yet empirical evidence on the net eﬀect of trade and 
environmental damage is mixed, with at least some studies (Dean 2002; 
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001) fi nding evidence that the technique 
eﬀect may be stronger than previously thought, leading to a net benefi cial 
impact of trade growth on the environment.
China’s integration with the world economy may not fi t this conventional 
picture. Much of China’s trade growth is attributable to the international frag-
mentation of production—the splitting of production processes into discrete 
sequential activities (fragments) that take place in diﬀerent countries3 (Chen 
et al. 2008; Ping 2005; Dean, Fung, and Wang 2008). China’s trade statistics 
explicitly designate “processing imports” as imports of intermediate inputs 
to be used to produce products solely for export and “processing exports” as 
those exports that use these imported inputs.4 This trade alone accounts for 
about 56 percent of the growth in China’s exports and 41 percent of the growth 
in China’s imports between 1995 and 2005. In addition, a large part of this 
trade is attributable to foreign- invested enterprises (FIEs).5 In 2005, about 84 
percent of China’s processing exports and imports were carried out by FIEs.
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Trade arising from international production fragmentation could be 
cleaner than conventional trade. If  highly fragmented industries (such as 
computers and other high- tech products) and the particular fragments within 
these products that China produces are relatively clean, then China’s output 
and trade would shift toward cleaner goods as these activities expand. In 
addition, if  the FIEs who carry out much of this trade in fragments produce 
using greener technologies than those used by domestic producers in China, 
production techniques within fragmented industries would become cleaner 
over time. In this way, both the composition and technique eﬀects of trade 
growth may be favorable to China’s environment.
This chapter explores these relationships using new evidence on the pol-
lution content of Chinese trade. We fi rst present evidence on the growth of 
trade and industrial emissions in China. Using oﬃcial Chinese environmen-
tal data on air and water pollution from MEP, we fi nd that industrial emis-
sions of primary pollutants have slowed or fallen over the last decade while 
trade has grown. Across most industrial sectors, the pollution intensity of 
production has also fallen. We then explore trends in the pollution intensity 
of Chinese trade. Building on highly disaggregated trade data from China 
Customs, we report new evidence that the pollution intensity of Chinese 
exports has fallen dramatically from 1995 to 2004. We use a counterfactual 
exercise to show that this decrease in the pollution intensity of trade is due 
partly to a shift in the composition of trade toward cleaner goods, but also 
to a shift in production technique toward cleaner processes.
Finally, we explore the possibility that production fragmentation and pro-
cessing trade may have played a role in making China’s trade cleaner. Build-
ing on the framework provided by Copeland and Taylor (1994), we develop 
a reduced form model of  the pollution intensity of  trade, incorporating 
standard determinants of a country’s production mix, such as factor propor-
tions, income per capita, and trade policy. We then incorporate a fragmented 
export sector, building upon the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996). The 
impact of fragmentation on the pollution intensity of China’s exports and 
imports is estimated using data on four pollutants over a ten- year period. We 
fi nd evidence consistent with the view that the increased role of processing 
trade and the extensive presence of FIEs have both contributed to reducing 
the pollution intensity of China’s trade.
11.2   An Overview of China’s Environmental Quality and Regulation
11.2.1   Environmental Quality
Descriptions of  China invite superlatives, and this is certainly true of 
China’s environmental problems. There are almost daily media reports of 
rivers and lakes poisoned by pollution and algal bloom, water tables drop-
ping too low to meet basic needs, farmlands tainted by industrial pollution 
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6. An excellent and informative example is the New York Times series, Choking on Growth, 
which reports on many aspects of China’s environmental challenge. See http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html.
and fertilizers, and cities choking on smog.6 With economic growth fore-
casts exceeding 10 percent, the associated growth in industrial and municipal 
wastes, vehicle emissions, agricultural runoﬀ, and deforestation have led 
observers to doubt the sustainability of China’s development path. Indeed, 
as Naughton (2007, 503) notes, “The challenges of water availability, resil-
ience of the natural environment, and atmospheric degradation and climate 
change are among the most serious that China confronts.”
China’s environmental problems are not the result of current emissions 
alone. The accumulation of past pollution; the ability of the air, land, and 
water to refresh itself; and changes in settlement patterns are all refl ected in 
today’s environment. Even if  all economic activity were halted today, China 
would face serious “pollution problems” for years to come. When thinking 
about the eﬀect of  economic activity on the environment, therefore, it is 
important to distinguish between emissions, the “fl ow” of pollutants into 
the environment, and ambient quality, the “stock” of pollutants present at 
a specifi c point in time. Our analysis focuses on the former, while most news 
reports focus on the latter.
To put our discussion of trade and emissions (fl ows) into perspective, it is 
useful to review briefl y trends in China’s ambient quality (stocks). Despite 
widespread awareness of China’s recurrent environmental crises, it is diﬃcult 
to obtain consistent evidence on environmental quality. Repeated measures 
of ambient quality are available only through MEP, and even oﬃcial reports 
refl ect changing measurement methods and defi nitions over time, as Chi-
na’s environmental regulation and monitoring capability have improved. 
The data used in this study are drawn from oﬃcial Chinese sources. There 
are many problems with oﬃcial Chinese data, and environmental statistics 
are no exception. Nevertheless, there is no alternative set of data available. 
Moreover, these data provide systematic information to an area of research 
often dominated by anecdote.
Figure 11.1 provides summary data on the trend in water quality for 
China’s seven major rivers drawn from MEP’s annual State of the Environ-
ment reports. From 2001 to 2005, there has been some improvement in 
water quality. The percentage of  monitoring sections of  the seven major 
rivers meeting a grade III quality standard or better rose from 30 percent 
to 40 percent, while the percentage considered to be highly polluted (grade 
V or worse than grade V) fell from 53 percent to 34 percent. These data 
suggest that China has succeeded in raising the quality of  its extremely 
polluted water to a more moderately polluted level, but has made little 
progress in raising much of  its water to the higher grade standards. These 
summary measures, though, hide substantial variation in water quality in 
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diﬀerent segments of  the rivers and in their tributaries. For example, the 
mainstream of the Yellow River is considered to be only lightly polluted, 
while most of  its tributaries are heavily polluted (MEP 2007). Freshwater 
lakes and reservoirs remain heavily polluted. In 2006, 48 percent of  major 
lakes and reservoirs were listed as worse than grade V, implying that they 
are heavily polluted (MEP 2007). The most ubiquitous pollutant is readily 
degradable organic materials from industry and households, with indus-
try’s share of  these pollutants falling from 50 percent to 38 percent by 2005 
(MEP 2007).
National survey data summarized by the World Bank (2001) suggest that 
total emissions of major air pollutants (SO2, soot, and dust) peaked in the 
mid 1990s. As shown in fi gure 11.2, MEP reports that urban air quality 
continued to improve between 2000 and 2005. The percentage of cities with 
air quality rated grade II (up to standard) or better rose from 37 percent 
to 52 percent during this period. Again, there are indications that most of 
China’s progress has been in reducing the extent of severe air pollution, as 
the percentage of cities with air quality worse than grade III fell from 33 
percent to 11 percent. Particulates are considered the most important pollut-
ant aﬀecting urban air quality, both in terms of frequency and health costs. 
Particulate emissions are heaviest in China’s largest cities, including Beijing 
and Tianjin, due in part to the rapid growth of motor vehicle emissions in 
Fig. 11.1  Water quality: Seven major rivers
Source: Data from MEP, Report on the State of the Environment, various years. http://english
.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/soe.
Note: Comparable data for earlier years are unavailable.
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these areas. More than 80 percent of SO2 and dust and most soot is attrib-
uted to industrial sources, which include coal- fi red power plants.
11.2.2   Environmental Regulation and Policy
The Chinese government has long recognized the need for environmental 
protection. In 1989, a legislative base for environment protection was created 
by promulgation of the Environmental Protection Law. This law authorized 
the Environmental Protection Bureau of the State Council to set ambient 
standards and waste discharge and emission standards. In 1984, the bureau 
gained administrative independence as a separate oﬃce and its oﬃce staﬀ 
size doubled. The bureau was renamed the National Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (NEPA) four years later, its staﬀ size again doubled, and it was 
given direct links to the State Council. In recognition of the increasing impor-
tance placed upon environment in the overall development plan, NEPA was 
renamed the State Environmental Protection Agency and given ministerial 
rank in 1998. Despite this rank, SEPA did not have a seat in the State Council 
and remained less powerful than some other key ministries (OECD 2005), 
until it became the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008. It is consid-
ered to be underfunded and undermanned for the large portfolio it oversees.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection is responsible for developing 
policies and programs at the national level. In each province, Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) oversee compliance with national and local envi-
Fig. 11.2  Urban air quality
Source: Data from MEP, Report on the State of the Environment, various years. http://english
.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/soe/soe2006/200711/t2007/1105_112560.htm.
Note: Comparable data for earlier years are unavailable.
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7. MEP also oversees a substantial program of pollution control, with 1.4 percent of GDP 
devoted to this purpose in 2003 (Naughton 2007). They also engage in scientifi c projects and 
international cooperative agreements promoting “leapfrogging” development, among other 
activities (MEP 2007).
ronmental regulations. These local bureaus report to provincial administra-
tors, which also oversee their funding. Recently, MEP has acquired some say 
in the selection of provincial EPB heads. The EPBs also exist at the prefec-
ture, or municipal, and district or county levels. The EPBs report directly to 
upper- level environmental administrators as well as to the government of a 
geographic area. This reporting system is often cited as a source of confl ict 
for local EPBs who may face interference from local leaders. Lower- level 
EPBs report to higher level EPBs, but the funding and supervision are pro-
vided by the province or lower- level administration (OECD 2005).
China has a well- developed regulatory system with over 2,000 laws related 
to environmental protection. During the 1990s, China gave increasing 
emphasis to prevention and shifted responsibility to polluters to pay for 
environmental damage. A key policy instrument in this shift was the intro-
duction of a discharge fee system, with fees based on the concentration of 
eﬄuents. These fees are applied to industrial emissions across China, with 
most revenue accruing from fees for discharges of  wastewater and waste 
gases. This system has been criticized on a number of dimensions. It is widely 
believed that the fees are only a fraction of the social cost of pollution and 
that the fees do not encourage abatement. Local EPBs can also issue permits 
that limit the quantities and concentrations of pollutants in an enterprise’s 
emissions, set deadlines for pollution control, and close plants deemed 
dependent on “backward” technology.
More recently, the criminal code has been revised to provide for criminal 
sanctions for egregious harm to the environment (OECD 2005). Environ-
mental impact assessment has become routine for major economic projects 
and MEP and EPBs can suspend or delay projects that do not meet envi-
ronmental standards. In 1992, the Chinese government removed a number 
of sectoral and regional restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
decentralized approval (Lardy 1994). New rules introduced in 1995 prohibit 
foreign investment that involves dangerous, polluting, or wasteful processes 
(Henley, Kirkpatrick, and Wilde 1999).7
11.3   Trends in Chinese Industrial Emissions and Manufacturing Trade
11.3.1   Aggregate Trends
In this chapter, our interest is in the relationship between China’s trade 
and China’s environment, rather than the global environment. Hence, we 
focus on the primary pollutants that China uses to evaluate the condition 
of its own environment, rather than the greenhouse gases associated with 
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8. China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2006, 207).
9. China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2006, 208).
10. Changes in Chinese industrial emissions should be fairly representative of air pollution 
emissions because industry accounts for at least 80 percent of SO2, smoke, and dust emissions 
throughout the period. Chinese industrial water pollution emissions accounted for 60 percent 
of COD emissions at the start of the period. With emissions from households and services 
growing in importance, industry’s share fell to only 40 percent by the end of the period.
global climate change. In the 10th Five- Year Plan (2001–2005), the Chinese 
government stated explicit goals for the reduction of its water pollution, as 
measured by chemical oxygen demand (COD) and its air pollution, as mea-
sured by sulfur dioxide (SO2) and particulate matter, especially that gener-
ated by smoke and dust (OECD 2005). Chemical oxygen demand measures 
the mass concentration of  oxygen consumed by chemical breakdown of 
organic and inorganic matter in water.8 Chemical oxygen demand emis-
sions account for the majority of industrial water pollution levies collected 
in China during this period. While emissions of other water pollutants are 
recorded in more recent years, they are generally positively correlated with 
COD. Industrial SO2 emissions include the sulfur dioxide emitted from fuel 
burning and from the production processes on the premises of an enterprise. 
Industrial smoke (or soot) emissions include smoke emitted from fuel burn-
ing on the premises of an enterprise. Industrial dust emissions refer to the 
volume of dust suspended in the air and emitted by an enterprise’s produc-
tion processes.9
Figure 11.3 shows the trends in China’s overall merchandise trade (billions 
of US$ [2000]) and industrial emissions (billions of kilos) from 1995 to 2005. 
Trade data are Chinese oﬃcial data obtained from China Customs. Indus-
trial emissions data are from the Chinese Environmental Yearbook and China 
Statistical Yearbook on Environment (various issues). In Chinese oﬃcial sta-
tistics, the industrial sector includes Mining, Manufacturing, and Produc-
tion and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, and Water.10 Emissions data prior 
to 1998 were recorded only for industrial enterprises at the “county level and 
above.” After the “Investigation on Sources of Township Industrial Pollu-
tion,” published in 1997, it was found that township and village industrial 
enterprises (TVIEs) were accounting for a growing percentage of emissions. 
Therefore, emissions data include these enterprises from 1998 onward. In 
fi gures 11.3 and 11.4, we have been able to include TVIE emissions for 1995 
and for 1997. But the TVIE data are unavailable for 1996, so we treat 1996 
as missing (indicated by the dashed lines).
The most remarkable trend in fi gure 11.3 is the dramatic and rapid increase 
in the value of China’s merchandise exports plus imports over the period. 
By 2005, trade had increased nearly 300 percent in real terms over its 1995 
value. During that same period, industrial emissions were decreasing. This 
decline is confi rmed in the ten- year environmental review issued by MEP 
(2006) and is also noted by the World Trade Organization (WTO; 2006) and 
Fig. 11.3  China’s trade and industrial emissions, 1995–2005
Source: Trade data are from China Customs. Industrial emissions data are from the Chinese 
Environment Yearbook and China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (various issues).
Fig. 11.4  The pollution intensity of China’s trade, 1995–2004
Source: Data calculations by authors, as described in the text.
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the OECD (2005). In 2005, annual industrial emissions of COD, smoke, and 
dust had declined to 56 percent, 46 percent, and 40 percent, respectively, of 
their levels in 1995. In contrast, industrial SO2 emissions rose after 1999 and 
were 17.5 percent above 1995 levels by 2005.
11.3.2   Trends in the Composition of China’s Trade
To understand what is driving these aggregate trends, we fi rst examine 
trends in the composition of China’s trade. Because data on emissions by 
industrial sectors are readily available, but data for agricultural or service 
sectors are not, we limit our analysis to manufacturing trade. In 2005, manu-
facturing trade accounted for 97 percent of Chinese exports and 83 percent 
of Chinese imports. Table 11.1 shows the shares of exports and imports in 
1995 and 2004, by two- digit International Standard Industrial Classifi cation 
(ISIC) sectors in manufacturing. The Chinese trade data were aggregated to 
Harmonized System (HS) (six- digit) and then converted to ISIC Revision 3 
using the oﬃcial Chinese concordance.
Even at this rather aggregated level, table 11.1 reveals some dramatic shifts 
in the sectoral composition of Chinese trade over this time period. In 1995, 
textiles and apparel accounted for the largest shares of  Chinese exports 
to the world. These shares fell by about a third by 2004, while the export 
share of oﬃce and computing machinery grew by a factor of fi ve, and that 
of communications equipment more than doubled. The largest shares of 
Chinese imports in 1995 were attributable to textiles and machinery. These 
shares fell by about 70 percent and 40 percent, respectively, by 2004, while 
import shares in oﬃce and computing machinery and in communications 
equipment more than doubled.
The sectoral shift in the composition of China’s trade is interesting not 
only because it is dramatic, but because the same sectors have shown increases 
in both export and import shares. This suggests that much growth has taken 
place in sectors where production is internationally fragmented, resulting in 
two- way trade in “fragments” at varying stages of production. One rough 
indicator of the degree to which industries are internationally fragmented is 
the share of processing exports (imports) in each sector’s total trade. Textile 
and apparel exports had substantial shares of  processing exports across 
sectors in 1995, which fell somewhat by 2004. In contrast, oﬃce equipment 
and computing and communications equipment had extremely high shares 
of processing exports in 1995, and these shares remained high in 2004. Simi-
larly, table 11.2 shows a decline in the share of processing imports in textiles 
and a contrasting rise in that share in communications equipment imports, 
though not in oﬃce and computing machinery imports. This evidence sug-
gests that China’s exports (and, to a lesser extent, imports) have become 
more concentrated in highly fragmented sectors and that the degree of frag-
mentation in some of these sectors has grown over time.
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11. We measure pollution intensity as emissions relative to the value of output because the 
trade data are also measured in terms of value and our main concern is to measure the pollution 
intensity of the trade bundle. For some analyses of industrial pollution intensity, a measure 
of emissions per unit of value added might be preferable. We are unable to express pollution 
intensity relative to value added because value added data are not available at a suﬃciently 
disaggregated level. A comparison of the two measures could reveal important, but unknown, 
diﬀerences. Because the emissions data are classifi ed by economic activity, the numerator of 
these two measures should be similar as they are not aﬀected by changes in the value of pur-
chased intermediates used in the production process. However, the denominators will diﬀer if  
an increase in purchased intermediates increases the value of output, thereby reducing pollution 
measured relative to total value but not relative to value added.
12. The oﬃcial Chinese concordance maps the Chinese 2002 industrial classifi cation at the 
four- digit level to ISIC Revision 3 at the four- digit level. Though some ISIC two- digit sec-
tors correspond to a single Chinese two- digit “division,” some correspond to either multiple 
Chinese divisions or to one division plus several four- digit lines from other divisions. Thus, 
the average pollution intensities for the ISIC two- digit sectors in table 11.2 generally represent 
a production- weighted average of the pollution intensity of multiple Chinese divisions. The 
production weights were constructed using Chinese gross industrial output data at the four-
 digit level from http://www.chinadataonline.org. Because not all sample years were available, 
weights were constructed using 2004 data.
13. ISIC 37 (recycling activities) is omitted. See appendix for discussion.
14. Because there are fewer ISIC two- digit sectors than Chinese divisions, there is some varia-
tion between the highest pollution intensities in table 11.2 and table 11A.1.
11.3.3   Trends in Industrial Pollution Intensity
To see the extent to which changes in production technology could be 
impacting emissions, we measure the pollution intensity of production by 
industry, from 1995 to 2004. We compiled data on emissions of the four 
pollutants at the industry level, as well as current value of output of the 
sampled enterprises, from the Chinese Environmental Yearbooks (Chinese 
editions). Pollution intensities were then calculated as emissions (kilos) per 
thousand yuan output (constant 1995 yuan) for thirty- three Chinese two-
 digit “divisions,” including thirty manufacturing industries and three utili-
ties, in the Chinese 2002 industrial classifi cation.11 These pollution intensities 
are shown in appendix table 11A.1. The appendix also provides a detailed 
explanation of these calculations and the treatment of missing or aggregated 
data. In table 11.2 we present these average water and air pollution intensi-
ties (in kilos per thousand yuan output [constant 1995 yuan]), mapped to 
the ISIC two- digit sectors, for 1995 and in 2004.12 Pollution intensities for 
manufacturing (ISIC 15–36) and for utilities (ISIC 40–41) are included in the 
table.13 In each year, the three sectors with the highest pollution intensities 
are shown in bold for each pollutant.14
Of the manufacturing industries, the major source of water pollution is 
production of paper and paper products. A few others—food products and 
beverages and wood products—show relatively high water pollution intensi-
ties, but these are far below that of the paper sector. Most industries show 
very low water pollution intensity. With respect to air pollution, nonmetallic 
minerals (which include cement) is by far the most SO2- intensive and among 
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15. The ISIC Revision 3 groups the electricity and fuel gas utilities into ISIC 40, and as a 
result, the dust intensity for ISIC 40 looks quite low. But fuel gas production and supply has 
the second highest dust intensity across Chinese divisions.
the top three in terms of smoke and dust. The other industries with high 
air pollution intensities include basic metals and paper (SO2), paper and 
wood (smoke), and wood and basic metals (dust). But again these industries 
generally show much lower pollution intensities than nonmetallic minerals. 
Most industries, in fact, show very low air pollution intensities. The utilities 
as a group are highly polluting. The water utility is second only to paper 
production in water pollution intensity. The electricity and gas utilities are 
the dirtiest sectors overall in terms of SO2 and smoke.
15
Table 11.2 also reveals two interesting trends. The fi rst is that across nearly 
all sectors, the pollution intensity of production has fallen over time. This is 
true for all four pollutants. Even the water and energy utilities show improve-
ment over the period. Thus, there is some evidence of a shift toward cleaner 
industrial production techniques in China. The second trend is that China’s 
trade does appear to be shifting toward cleaner sectors over time. Although 
trade in 1995 was not concentrated in the highest polluting sectors, tex-
tiles and leather products were somewhat high in terms of water pollution 
intensity and certainly not the lowest in terms of SO2 and smoke intensity. 
Though these industries show cleaner production techniques by 2004, they 
remain signifi cantly more polluting than oﬃce and computing machinery 
and communications equipment. The latter sectors’ pollution intensities 
were low in 1995 and extremely low as of 2004.
The pollution intensities in table 11.2 include direct water and air emis-
sions from production processes within each two- digit sector and indirect air 
emissions from fuel burning on enterprise premises. For a complete assess-
ment of indirect emissions, we would ideally use an input- output (IO) table 
to capture emissions generated by (a) use of domestically produced inter-
mediates in other two- digit ISIC sectors, and (b) use of energy and water 
purchased from utilities. However, two main issues impede such an assess-
ment. First, goods exported under the processing regime use more imported 
intermediates—and, therefore, less domestically produced intermediates—
than those exported under the normal regime. Thus, the IO table would 
have to distinguish imports of fi nal goods from imports of intermediates 
and then distinguish imported intermediates used for processing exports 
from those used for normal exports. Second, indirect emissions from fuel 
burning on site are already included in our pollution intensities. Thus, IO 
coeﬃcients refl ecting energy demand would have to be adjusted to net out 
on- site supplies.
The oﬃcial Chinese IO table does not address either of these issues. In 
recent work, Dean, Fung, and Wang (2008) and Koopman, Wang, and Wei 
(2008) provide an improved method for identifying imported intermedi-
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16. Both papers include discussion of advances over earlier analyses by Chen et al. (2008) 
and Ping (2005).
ates and for splitting the Chinese IO table between processing exports and 
normal exports for 123 sectors for 1997 and 2002.16 In theory, this could 
be used to address the fi rst issue discussed above for two years in our sample. 
However, because no separate data exist for the use of domestic interme-
diates in processing and normal exports (including energy and water), 
diﬀerences only emerge after rebalancing. There appear to be no data avail-
able to address the second issue. This is a critical drawback to any calcula-
tion of indirect emissions because this could lead to double- counting with 
respect to emissions from energy use, and table 11.2 shows that Chinese 
utilities are highly polluting industries. Therefore, in the present analysis, we 
use the pollution intensities in table 11.2 to assess changes in the pollution 
intensity of Chinese trade.
11.4   The Pollution Intensity of Chinese Trade
If  the popular wisdom were correct, we would expect China’s continuing 
trade liberalization, particularly after its 2001 WTO accession, to lead to 
increased specialization in “dirty goods” (Gardner 2008). This composi-
tion eﬀect, along with increased scale of production, would be expected to 
worsen emissions and lead to “dirtier” trade than in earlier years (ceteris 
paribus). However, thus far we have presented at least superfi cial evidence 
that trade has shifted toward cleaner industries and that industrial produc-
tion has become cleaner over time. In addition, this evidence suggests that 
production fragmentation may have played a role in these trends. In the 
evidence we present below, we fi nd:
•  Chinese exports are less water- pollution intensive and generally less 
air- pollution intensive than Chinese imports.
•  Both Chinese exports and imports are becoming cleaner over time.
•  The cleaner trends in exports and imports are driven by both composi-
tion and technique eﬀects, with the latter being the strongest.
•  Processing trade is indeed cleaner than ordinary trade.
To measure the pollution intensity of Chinese trade, we bring together 
the Chinese manufacturing pollution intensities discussed earlier and the 
Chinese trade data. Early studies of the pollution intensity of U.S. trade 
(Walter 1973; Robison 1988) did not have industrial emissions data so had to 
rely on estimates of environmental control costs (e.g., abatement capital and 
operating costs and research and development [R&D]) to calculate pollu-
tion intensity by industry. More recently, Ederington, Levinson, and Minier 
(2004) made use of  U.S. industrial emissions data for a single year, and 
changes in the composition of exports and imports over time, to construct 
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17. In the very few cases where several Chinese divisions map to a single ISIC four- digit 
line, a production- weighted pollution intensity is assigned. As before, production weights are 
constructed from the 2004 Chinese four- digit level gross industrial output value data from 
China Data Online.
18. The peak in dust emissions intensity is largely due to the inclusion from 1998 onward of 
emissions from TVIEs. Because TVIE emissions data are unavailable at the sectoral level, the 
yearly industrial pollution intensities in 1995 to 1997 do not include TVIEs.
changes in the pollution intensity of U.S. exports and imports. While this 
was a signifi cant advance, the lack of time series emissions data confi ned 
the observed changes over time to composition eﬀects. In a recent paper, 
Levinson (2009) uses several years of U.S. industrial emissions data to dis-
cern the relative importance of  composition and technique eﬀects in the 
pollution intensity of U.S. trade.
Here we use the annual Chinese pollution intensities across industries and 
annual trade data to calculate an export- or import- weighted average pol-
lution intensity for aggregate exports (imports) for each of the eleven years 
in the sample (1995–2004). Using the oﬃcial Chinese concordance, we map 
the Chinese pollution intensity for each Chinese division to the four- digit 
ISIC lines corresponding to that division.17 This pollution intensity is then 
weighted by the share of manufacturing exports (imports) corresponding 
to that four- digit ISIC line, and summed to yield an export- or import-
 weighted average pollution intensity for each year.
Figure 11.4 shows that both exports and imports became steadily cleaner 
throughout the period. By 2004, the water pollution intensity of exports had 
fallen by about 84 percent, while that of imports had fallen by 89 percent, 
compared to 1995 levels. The drop in air pollution intensity was almost as 
dramatic, with export (import) SO2 intensity falling by 75 percent (78 per-
cent), smoke intensity by 75 percent (80 percent), and dust intensity by 73 
percent (74 percent).18 Interestingly, both Ederington, Levinson, and Minier 
(2004) and Levinson (2009) fi nd evidence that U.S. exports and imports also 
have become cleaner over time.
Chinese exports also appear to be much cleaner than Chinese imports. In 
1995, had Chinese imports been produced in China, they would have gener-
ated about 70 percent more COD emissions per thousand yuan than Chinese 
exports. This diﬀerence diminishes over time but remains throughout the 
period. Chinese exports are also less SO2- intensive, and less smoke- intensive, 
than Chinese imports during 1995 to 2004, though these divergences are 
less dramatic than the water pollution case. Only if  pollution intensity is 
measured with respect to dust emissions do we fi nd Chinese exports dirtier 
than imports.
To understand the relative role of composition and technique eﬀects in 
generating these trends in pollution intensity, we conduct a counterfactual 
experiment. We recalculate the pollution intensity of both aggregate exports 
and aggregate imports, assuming the pollution intensity of  sectoral out-
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19. We are indebted to Arik Levinson for this observation.
put remained at its 1995 levels. These counterfactual pollution intensities, 
shown by the dashed lines in fi gure 11.5, represent the change in pollution 
intensity of exports (imports) if  only the composition of traded products 
had changed over time.
For all four pollutants, fi gure 11.4 shows that changes in the composition 
of  trade did imply both cleaner exports and imports. However, in every 
case, these composition eﬀects account for a relatively small proportion 
of the observed changes in the pollution intensity of  trade. This suggests 
that China’s cleaner production techniques have been the most important 
force behind cleaner trade. It should be noted that with pollution intensity 
data only available at the Chinese two- digit level, the composition (tech-
nique) eﬀect could be understated (overstated) in fi gure 11.4. A change in 
the composition of trade among activities within a division could lead to 
lower pollution intensity, but would be misattributed in our data to a tech-
nique eﬀect.19 While this is certainly possible, a closer look at the variation 
in the trade data suggests that within division changes in the composition 
of trade are not likely to be large enough to reverse the result. Interestingly, 
Levinson (2009) also fi nds evidence that technique eﬀects are more impor-
tant than composition eﬀects in explaining the falling pollution intensity 
of  U.S. trade.
Because table 11.1 shows a shift in the composition of  China’s trade 
toward highly fragmented manufacturing sectors, and because table 11.2 
Fig. 11.5  The pollution intensity of China’s overall trade and processing trade, 
1995–2004
Source: Data calculations by authors, as described in the text.
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suggests that these sectors are relatively low polluters, we examine more 
closely the pollution intensity of  processing trade. Because the Chinese 
industrial pollution data are not diﬀerentiated by customs regime, the 
export- or import- weighted pollution intensities for processing trade diﬀer 
from those for overall trade solely due to the composition of products traded 
under the processing regime. As fi gure 11.5 shows, many of the trends in the 
pollution intensities for overall trade are also true for processing trade. Pro-
cessing exports appear to be cleaner than processing imports with respect 
to all pollutants. Processing exports and imports also both show downward 
trends in pollution intensity during the period. Counterfactual results (not 
shown) also suggest that, once again, composition eﬀects are responsible for 
a small share of the decline in pollution intensity over time.
However, fi gure 11.5 also reveals that China’s processing exports are 
cleaner than China’s overall exports. The average COD, SO2, and smoke 
intensities of processing exports are about 70 percent that of overall exports 
in 1995. The dust intensity of processing exports is even lower—only about 
50 percent that of overall trade. Though some of these diﬀerences diminish 
over time, processing exports continue to have signifi cantly lower pollution 
intensities than overall exports across all four pollutants throughout the 
period. This evidence is suggestive that the increase in China’s processing 
exports has implied a composition eﬀect that is favorable toward China’s 
environment. This eﬀect might be further magnifi ed if  the fi rms engaged 
in processing trade (largely foreign- invested fi rms) actually produce with 
cleaner techniques than average fi rms.
11.5   The Role of Fragmentation and FDI in Explaining 
the Pollution Intensity of Chinese Trade
To explore the role that production fragmentation and foreign invest-
ment play in the changes we observe in the pollution intensity of  China’s 
trade, we develop a model that embeds China into the global production 
network. Our model is tailored for the Chinese context in that it recognizes 
the magnitude of  foreign investment and its eﬀects on the composition of 
trade. The framework we use draws upon the structural model of  pollu-
tion developed by Copeland and Taylor (1994) and the outsourcing model 
developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). We fi rst consider the supply of 
pollution to identify the determinants of  pollution regulation. Next, we 
examine the demand for pollution, fi rst considering the pollution intensity 
of  exports in a simple two- sector model without fragmented production 
and then adding a fragmented export sector. We use these models to explore 
the impact of  foreign investment and trade liberalization on the pollution 
content of  trade. Our goal is to derive several reduced form models of  the 
determinants of  the pollution intensity of  Chinese trade, which we then 
test empirically.
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20. Pollution tax revenue is counted in G as a return to D, and it is assumed to be rebated 
to citizens lump sum.
21. Because we have adopted a specifi cation in which the marginal disutility of pollution is 
constant, the pollution supply curve is horizontal. See Copeland and Taylor (2003) for further 
discussion and alternative specifi cations.
11.5.1   Pollution Supply
We follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) in modeling the supply of pol-
lution as the result of government behavior that maximizes the utility of a 
representative citizen:
(1) V  u(R)  D.
Indirect utility is a function of real income, R, and the level of environmental 
damage, D. The government levies a pollution tax, , to induce the utility-
 maximizing level of damage, taking as given world prices, trade policy, and 
production possibilities. The gross national product (GNP) function gives 
the maximum value of national income as a function of domestic prices, 
the pollution tax rate, and vector of factor endowments. Consequently, real 
income for the representative citizen can be expressed as R  G(p,,)/Lp, 
where p is a price index, and L is the number of citizens.20 Maximization 
of  equation (1) yields the Samuelson rule for public good provision: the 
government sets the pollution tax equal to the sum of marginal damages 
across all citizens. Marginal damage measures the willingness to pay for 
reduced emissions, and it refl ects the marginal rate of substitution between 
emissions and income. Given the indirect utility function (1), the pollution 
tax rate chosen is:
(2)   L
VD
VI
  
Lp

u(R)
where the right- hand side gives the marginal damage from pollution.21 Using 
equation (2), we express the endogenous pollution tax as (L, p, R).
11.5.2   Pollution Demand without Production Fragmentation
We begin with the simplest model of production and trade. This model 
serves as an alternative to a second model, presented below, that explicitly 
incorporates export processing with imported intermediate inputs. We con-
sider a two- sector model of a small, open economy. China is endowed with 
capital and eﬀective labor (E), which depends on the human capital of its 
labor force: E  A(H)L. The import- competing sector, M, uses eﬀective 
labor and capital and it serves as numeraire. Each unit of  M produced 
releases one unit of pollution emissions.
The export sector produces Good Y using eﬀective labor and capital. 
Eﬀective labor may also be used for abatement of the pollution emissions 
(D) created in the production process. Following Copeland and Taylor’s 
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22. It is common to assume that pollution intensity rises with the capital intensity of produc-
tion. Copeland and Taylor (2003) provide some evidence for the case of SO2.
(2003) form for abatement, we may express the production function for Y 
treating emissions as an input:
(3) Y  (EY
1	 D	Y)

 KY
1
,
where 0  	  1. The relative domestic price of Y is p   p∗, where 1/ is a 
measure of trade frictions, and p∗ is China’s terms of trade. We use equation 
(3) to solve for the pollution intensity of export production, eY:
(4) eY  
DY
pY
  
	



.
We use equation (4) to create our fi rst estimating equation for the pollu-
tion intensity of Chinese exports. In doing so, we note that the pollution 
intensity given by equation (4) depends on the pollution intensity of China’s 
export production, as measured by the term, 	. As Copeland and Taylor 
(2003) discuss, diﬀerences across countries in factor abundance interact with 
regulatory diﬀerences to determine the pattern of trade. These consider-
ations lead to an expression for the pollution intensity of Chinese exports 
of the form:
(5) eY  eY(K, H, L, )  eY(K, H, L, R, p∗, ).
In this expression we have replaced the pollution tax rate with its determi-
nants, based on equation (2). Thus, the pollution intensity of exports can be 
estimated as a function of China’s factor endowments, its real income per 
capita, its terms of trade, and its trade frictions.
An increase in China’s overall capital- labor ratio should raise the capital 
intensity of  both the import- competing and export sectors. If  pollution 
intensity rises with the capital intensity of  production, we would expect 
China’s capital- labor ratio to be positively related to the pollution intensity 
of both its exports and its imports.22 Because an increase in real income raises 
the level of the pollution tax, we expect the pollution intensity of exports to 
fall as China’s real income rises. The terms of trade and trade frictions have 
ambiguous eﬀects on pollution intensity. Improved terms of trade imply an 
increase in real gross domestic product (GDP) and, hence, a higher domestic 
pollution tax, reducing e, but a higher relative price for exports raises the 
production value of factors used in abatement, raising e. If  this latter con-
sideration dominates, we would expect improved terms of trade and reduced 
trade frictions to raise the pollution intensity of China’s exports.
11.5.3   Pollution Demand with Production Fragmentation
As an alternative to the simple two- sector model above, we consider a 
model with two export sectors. China is treated as a small economy rela-
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tive to an advanced trading bloc (A). The fi rst sector produces “ordinary” 
exports, those that are produced with domestic inputs, using the production 
technology given by equation (3). The “processing” sector produces a set of 
goods that are intermediate inputs for a single fi nal good. This fi nal good 
is costlessly assembled from a continuum of intermediate inputs, indexed 
by z ∈ [0,1]. Inputs are produced using eﬀective labor, capital specifi c to the 
processing sector, and pollution discharge. Input production technology 
varies by the amount of labor used relative to the emissions created during 
production. We adopt a simple functional form for production technology 
of input z:
(6) x(z)  [E(z)1(z) D(z)(z)]
 K(z)1
.
We also restrict (z) ∈[

(z), (z)], 0  

    1, and 0  
  1. We assume 
that ordinary export production is more pollution- intensive than processing 
export production, implying that 	  .
Intermediate producers consider the price of labor, capital, and pollu-
tion discharge when choosing a production technique. The price of labor, 
w, measures the wage per eﬀective labor unit, thereby accounting for labor 
quality diﬀerences across countries. The rental price of capital is given by r. 
If  fi rms were unregulated, they would always choose to discharge as much 
as possible to economize on labor. However, China levies a pollution tax, , 
according to equation (2), and this tax is eﬀective in the sense that fi rms abate 
some pollution. Given these factor prices, the fi rm’s labor and discharge 
combination that satisfi es cost minimization is:
(7) 
w


   1  (z)(z)  D(z)E(z) .
Because equation (7) implies that the parameter (z) determines how pol-
lution discharge varies among intermediates producers, (z) provides a 
measure of pollution intensity. We can order the intermediates in order of 
decreasing pollution intensity to obtain (z)  0.
To determine the pattern of trade between China and the advanced coun-
tries, we examine how unit production costs vary across intermediates. The 
unit cost of producing one unit of input x in country i is given by:
(8) c(wi, i, ri; z)  κ(z)wi[1(z)]
i(z)
 ri1
,
where κ(z) is an industry- specifi c constant. Input z is produced in an 
advanced country if  c(wA, A, rA; z)  c(wC, C, rC; z).
We assume that labor in the advanced bloc has high human capital levels 
and, thus, it is more productive than labor in China. The pollution tax levied 
in the advanced countries exceeds the rate set in China, such that wA/A  
wC /C. Given these relative factor prices and assuming for the moment that 
rental rates are the same in both countries, input z would be produced in 
the advanced bloc if
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23. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) introduce a similar diagram to illustrate the fragmentation 
of production between the United States and Mexico.
24. Copeland and Taylor (1994) also assume that budget shares are constant in their model, 
but they consider two countries large enough to aﬀect international markets.
(9)   
wA
wC
   CA 
(z)/[1(z)]
  T(z).
With A  C and (z)  0, T(z) must be increasing in z. The advanced bloc’s 
cost advantage increases as the pollution intensity of production decreases. 
For a given relative wage rate, , the T(z) locus determines a critical industry 
z∗ such that China has lower costs than the advanced bloc in the range of 
inputs indexed by z ∈[0, z∗), while the advanced bloc has lower costs in the 
range z ∈(z∗, 1].
Now we assume that the rental rate of  capital is not the same in both 
countries and that instead, rA  rC. Because capital’s cost share is the same 
across all goods, this rental diﬀerential lowers the cost of production in the 
advanced countries across the full range of intermediates. To consider an 
equilibrium with some trade in intermediates, we assume that despite its 
lower rental rate, the advanced bloc has a cost disadvantage for intermedi-
ates more pollution intensive than input z∗, defi ned as that input for which 
c(wA, A, rA; z)  c(wC, C, rC; z). Figure 11.6 shows the minimum cost locus 
for China as CC and for the advanced bloc as AA.23 While the slope of each 
locus depends on the underlying production functions, it can be shown that 
they are upward sloping.
The pollution intensity of this fragmented sector depends on which inputs 
China produces; that is, it depends on the value of z∗. Based on the produc-
tion functions (6), total discharge from the X sector is
(10) D  
z∗
0
D(z)dz  




 
z∗
0
 (z)p(z)x(z)dz.
For simplicity, we assume that demand by the fi nal good producer for each 
input is a constant share of total world expenditure and that, as a small coun-
try, China has a negligible impact on world income.24 Using this assumption, 
p(z)x(z)  ϕ(z)IW, in equation (10) leads to an expression for the pollution 
intensity of the fragmented sector:
(11)  eX  
z∗
0
 
D(z)

p(z)x(z)
 
p(z)x(z)

z∗0  p(z)x(z)dz
dz  



z∗0  p(z)x(z)dz
 
z∗
0
(z)ϕ(z)IWdz
Equation (11) allows us to express the pollution intensity of the processing 
sector as a function of the capital share of export output (1 – 
), the pollu-
tion tax, , and the critical value, z∗. When the capital share of processing 
exports rises, the average pollution intensity of these exports falls. Similarly, 
when the pollution tax rises, the average pollution intensity of processing 
exports falls. Last, an increase in the critical value, z∗, reduces the average 
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pollution intensity of the export processing sector because (z) is a decreas-
ing function of z. It is interesting also to note that an increase in z∗ reduces 
the pollution intensity of the inputs imported from the advanced countries 
for processing. Thus, when the range of inputs produced in China expands, 
the pollution intensity of both processing exports and processing imports 
declines.
As discussed above, the critical value, z∗ depends on the cost of  inter-
mediates production in China, c(wC, C, rC; z). Therefore, z∗ depends on all 
determinants of factor prices for the processing sector. These determinants 
are the terms of trade and the level of trade frictions, the determinants of 
the pollution tax rate, and all factor endowments. As discussed previously, 
foreign investment has been skewed toward those sectors that process and 
assembly imported intermediates. Therefore, we separate the capital stock 
into domestic (Kd) and foreign owned capital (Kf ), allowing us to express 
the pollution intensity of the export processing sector as:
(12) eX  eX(K
d, Kf, H, L, p∗, , R).
The pollution intensity of the whole export bundle is a weighted average of 
the pollution intensity of ordinary exports and the pollution intensity of 
processing exports. Using equation (5) to express the pollution intensity 
of ordinary exports and equation (12) to express the pollution intensity of 
processing exports and letting SX denote the share of total exports that are 
processing exports, the pollution intensity of China’s trade bundle is:
Fig. 11.6  FDI expands range of export processing activities performed in China
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25. There will also be feedback eﬀects, which we do not discuss here. First, increased foreign 
investment may raise domestic wages, but this wage eﬀect cannot overturn the direct eﬀect 
of foreign investment. Second, higher real per capita income implies a higher pollution tax, 
reinforcing the direct eﬀect by further reducing pollution intensity.
26. This possibility is consistent with evidence presented in Dean, Lovely, and Wang (2009) 
on the location decisions of foreign investors. While provincial variation in pollution taxes 
infl uenced the location of Chinese investors, no eﬀect was found for OECD investors.
(13)  e  SYeY  SXeX  eY  SX(eX  eY)  e(K
d, Kf, H, L, p∗, , R, SX),
where we have used the fact that SY  SX  1. Because we have assumed that 
eX  eY, an increase in the processing share of exports obviously reduces 
overall export pollution intensity, ceteris paribus.
Foreign capital fl ows primarily to the export processing sector, reduc-
ing its cost of  capital. Figure 11.6 can be used to illustrate the eﬀect of 
this capital infl ow on China’s input competitiveness. At constant wages and 
pollution tax, the curve labeled CC shifts down, causing z∗ to rise from z∗1 
to z∗2. With the pollution tax unchanged, there is no change in the pollution 
intensity of any intermediate. However, the capital infl ow pulls labor into the 
processing sector, raising its share in exports. Moreover, because China now 
produces intermediates that are less pollution- intensive than any it produced 
before, the average pollution intensity of China’s processing exports falls.25 
Likewise, the pollution intensity of China’s processing imports falls because 
China now imports a narrower set of  inputs, and this set is, on average, 
cleaner than before.
Foreign investment may reduce export pollution intensity through another 
channel, which we have not formally modeled, even if  we hold the processing 
share of  exports fi xed. Foreign investment often involves the use of  new 
capital equipment and new production techniques. In particular, investment 
from high- regulatory- standard countries may transfer new pollution control 
methods to the host country as investors use technology and techniques 
that they have developed within the context of stringent pollution regula-
tion.26 If  foreign investors bring this sort of “technique eﬀect” with them, 
the pollution intensity of China’s exports should be negatively associated 
with the level of foreign capital, even when the share of processing exports 
is held constant.
11.6   Estimating the Determinants of the Pollution Intensity 
of China’s Manufacturing Trade
How well does the previous model of production fragmentation and for-
eign investment explain the changes in the pollution intensity of Chinese 
exports and imports shown in fi gure 11.4? To fi nd out, we begin with the 
simple model expressed in equation (5), in which there is no fragmenta-
tion, and FDI plays no distinct role. We then consider the model expressed 
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27. See the discussion of published data, previous methods of  measurement, and recent 
innovations by Holz (2006), and the response by Chow (2006).
in equation (13), which incorporates both ordinary and fragmented trade. 
Last, we allow for the endogeneity of  fragmented trade and the explicit 
infl uence of foreign investment.
11.6.1   Econometric Specifi cation
Because the pollution intensity of exports (imports) in fi gure 11.5 is lin-
ear in logs, equation (5) could be estimated by pooling the data on the four 
pollutants over the period 1995 to 2004 and adding pollutant- specifi c fi xed 
eﬀects and a linear time trend:
 ln e jit  i  	1 ln Kit  	2 ln Lit  	3 ln pit  	4 ln it  	5 ln Rit 
  	6 ln trendit  εit,
(where j is exports or imports, i is pollutant, and t is time). However, sev-
eral diﬃculties arise with this approach. With this small sample of annual 
observations, the introduction of four additional variables (fi xed eﬀects and 
a trend) reduces the degrees of freedom substantially. In addition, recent 
literature suggests that there are many unresolved issues in the construc-
tion of  reliable data on the Chinese capital stock.27 Finally, some of  the 
macroeconomic explanatory variables in the model may be nonstationary. 
An alternative approach that addresses all three concerns is to estimate a 
fi rst- diﬀerenced specifi cation of the model in equation (5):
(5)  ln e jit    	1 ln Kit  	2 ln Lit  	3 ln pit  	4 ln it 
  	5 ln Rit  it,
where  indicates fi rst diﬀerence.
Equation (5) is estimated using pooled data on COD, SO2, smoke, and 
dust intensity of exports (imports) at the national level, from 1995 to 2004. 
After diﬀerencing, this yields a small panel of thirty- six observations. The 
estimation method is generalized least squares (GLS) with cross- section 
weights to correct for pollutant- specifi c heteroskedasticity. It might be rea-
sonable to assume that the pollution intensity of trade responds diﬀerently 
across pollutants. Unfortunately, the limited sample size prevents us from 
using a varying coeﬃcients model to explore this possibility. It might also 
be reasonable to assume that there is contemporaneous correlation across 
the pollutants in the sample. A change in the environmental regime, or a 
technological change that aﬀects several pollutants simultaneously, could 
cause error terms to be correlated across pollutants in a given year. To 
address this issue, specifi cations of equation (5) were also estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel- corrected cross- section standard 
errors (PCSE), which are robust to both cross- section heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation. A comparison of the results allowed us to 
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28. Because of the small sample size, not all specifi cations could be estimated using PSCE. 
Results are available from the authors upon request.
29. Gross domestic product per capita is in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
30. TRAINS has no Chinese tariﬀ data for 1994 to 1995 or 2002. The simple average MFN 
tariﬀ data for 1994 to 1995 (with no ad valorem equivalent [AVE] correction) was taken from 
Zhang, Zhang, and Wan (1998), and for 2002 (with no AVE correction) was taken from the 
WTO (2006).
assess the importance of contemporaneous correlation and the robustness 
of our results to an alternate estimation method. We found little diﬀerence 
in the results and so present only the GLS estimates.28
Most of the explanatory variables are constructed using data from the 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2007. Trends in the underlying 
data are shown in table 11.3. The log diﬀerence in the capital stock is proxied 
by gross capital formation (percent of GDP), while the log diﬀerence in the 
total labor force and in real GDP per capita are calculated directly from the 
data.29 In this simple model, investment is not diﬀerentiated by source nor 
labor supply by skill level. The log diﬀerence in relative prices is proxied by 
the diﬀerence in China’s net barter terms of trade, where the latter is defi ned 
as the ratio of the export price index to the import price index, measured 
relative to the base year 2000. The data used to calculate the log diﬀerence 
in tariﬀs are China’s simple average most- favored- nation (MFN) tariﬀs 
(ad valorem equivalent) taken from the UNCTAD TRAINS database, via 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).30
11.6.2   Estimating the Standard Model
Table 11.4 presents the results of estimation of equation (5) for exports in 
column (1). These results support some of the predictions discussed previ-
ously. Ignoring the role of processing trade, an increase in the capital- labor 
ratio increases the pollution intensity of  exports, suggesting that capital 
and pollution may be complements in production. Real GDP per capita—
the proxy for stringency in environmental regulations—is negatively related 
to the pollution intensity of exports, though the impact is not signifi cant. 
Trade liberalization appears to be favorable for China’s environment. A fall 
in China’s average tariﬀ is associated with a fall in the pollution intensity of 
exports. Because China’s tariﬀs actually fell by about 75 percent during this 
period, this suggests that trade reform may have contributed signifi cantly to 
China’s cleaner trade. In addition, China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001 
also seems to have been associated with a signifi cant reduction in the pol-
lution intensity of China’s exports. Finally, though the impact of a change 
in the terms of trade is indeterminate in theory, here an improvement in the 
terms of trade is associated with increased pollution intensity of exports. 
The parallel results for the pollution intensity of imports are shown in table 
11.5, column (1). While the results for trade barriers and entrance into the 
WTO are similar to that of exports, the results for other variables are much 
weaker.
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31. For example, the WTO (2006) reports that average tariﬀs on electronic and communi-
cations equipment imports fell with accession to the WTO. In April, 2003 China joined the 
WTO Information Technology Agreement, and 258 tariﬀ lines at the HS eight- digit level 
became subject to zero tariﬀs. Import licenses and quotas on certain products have also been 
removed.
11.6.3   Composition Eﬀects and Fragmentation
Moving beyond the simple model, we incorporate both ordinary and frag-
mented exports, as in the reduced form model in equation (13). This model 
suggests that changes in overall pollution intensity will be explained not 
only by the changing pollution intensity of ordinary exports, as in equa-
tion (5), but by growth in the share of  fragmented exports and changes 
in that subsector’s pollution intensity. The share of exports (imports) that 
are fragmented is proxied by the share of processing exports (imports) in 
total exports (imports). This variable is calculated directly from the trade 
data from China Customs; it includes both exports (imports) designated as 
processing and assembly, and those designated as processing with imported 
materials. We begin by treating the processing share as exogenous and simply 
add the change in this share to equation (5) to form equation (13).
(13)  ln e jit    	1 ln Kit  	2 ln Lit  	3 ln pit  	4 ln it 
  	5 ln Rit  	6SXit  υit
The results of estimating equation (13) (column [2] of table 11.4) show 
weak support for the idea that increased fragmentation has reduced the pol-
lution intensity of China’s exports. An increase in the share of processing 
exports by a percentage point reduces the pollution intensity of  China’s 
exports by about 0.01 percent. The share of  processing exports actually 
grew by about 6 percent during this time period, implying a larger impact 
than the small elasticity might suggest. However, in this specifi cation, the 
estimate is not signifi cant. The inclusion of the export processing share also 
strengthens the magnitude and signifi cance of factor endowments and real 
GDP per capita in explaining the pollution intensity of exports over time. 
The parallel results for imports (table 11.5, column [2]) are even more strik-
ing. The impact of an increase in the lagged share of processing imports on 
the pollution intensity of China’s imports is much larger and more signifi -
cant (compare tables 11.4 and 11.5, column [2]). In addition, the inclusion 
of the lagged import processing share also dramatically strengthens the sig-
nifi cance of all other explanatory variables (compare table 11.5, columns 
[1] and [2]).
However, the size of  the fragmented sector is most likely endogenous. 
Clearly changes in trade frictions and factor endowments infl uence the size of 
the processing export share. Trade barriers on imports in highly fragmented 
sectors have fallen over this time period.31 China’s entrance into the WTO 
has also meant more favorable access for China’s ordinary and fragmented 
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32. The CC line in fi gure 11.6 shifts up when labor is pulled out of the sector and wages 
rise.
exports in other WTO members’ markets. As discussed above, growth in 
foreign investment is predicted to raise the processing share of exports. Simi-
larly, if  export processing is more human- capital- intensive than ordinary 
export processing, growth in the relative supply of human capital will raise 
the share of resources devoted to export processing.
To account for this endogeneity, we reestimate equation (13) using instru-
mental variables. The instruments for growth in the processing export share 
include all other variables in the equation and the growth in the processing 
import share. Because by law, goods imported under the processing regime 
can only be used for production of processing exports, growth in the share 
of processing imports should be a good predictor of growth in the share 
of processing exports, while being uncorrelated with the dependent vari-
able. The instrumented results (column [3] of table 11.4) now show much 
stronger evidence that growth in the share of fragmented exports leads to 
cleaner exports. The elasticity of  pollution intensity with respect to pro-
cessing export share is much larger and is now highly signifi cant. The role 
of  factor endowments in strengthened by the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation and growth in real GDP per capita now signifi cantly reduces the 
pollution intensity of exports.
Table 11.5, column (3) shows the IV estimation for imports. In this case, 
the instruments include all other variables in the equation and the share of 
processing exports lagged two periods. The IV estimates are generally larger 
than those that ignored endogeneity, but otherwise simply reinforce the role 
of fragmentation found in column (2).
11.6.4   Composition Eﬀects, Technique Eﬀects, and FDI
Thus far, we have not distinguished investment by source nor labor by 
skill. Yet FDI plays a crucial role in fragmented trade. As argued above, an 
increase in FDI fl ows should reduce pollution intensity by increasing the 
share of processing exports and by increasing the critical value, z∗. Domes-
tic capital, in contrast, fl ows primarily to the import- competing and ordi-
nary export sectors. Thus, an increase in domestically sourced investment 
pulls factors out of the export- processing sector, reducing the critical value 
z∗, and increasing the average pollution intensity of the export- processing 
sector.32 Production shifts to the more highly polluting ordinary- export 
sector. Therefore, we expect that an increase in domestic investment raises 
the pollution intensity of China’s exports.
An increase in the relative supply of human capital acts, in the model, like 
a decrease in the Chinese eﬀective wage. A decrease in w shifts the CC line 
down in fi gure 11.6, allowing China to compete successfully in production 
of more human- capital- intensive intermediate inputs. Thus, an increase in 
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33. These data closely parallel oﬃcial Chinese data on utilized (or realized) FDI fl ows (per-
cent GDP; see Annual FDI Statistics, www.fdi.gov.cn).
34. Data on shares of population aged  six years by educational attainment are from various 
issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. Data for the year 1995 are from Cao (2000, 4).
35. The results for the impact of  the ratio of  skilled to unskilled labor on the pollution 
intensity of imports appear to be highly sensitive to the lag chosen. More data are required to 
determine how illustrative they really are.
Chinese human capital is predicted to reduce the pollution intensity of Chi-
na’s exports. An increase in unskilled labor, on the other hand, is predicted 
to have the opposite eﬀect.
The last two columns of  table 10.4 show evidence that is certainly sug-
gestive of  the important role that increased FDI and increased human 
capital play in making Chinese exports cleaner. In column (4) of  table 
11.4, we present results for the instrumented estimation of  equation (13) 
again, but with investment split between domestically sourced investment 
and FDI. FDI (percent of  GDP) is taken from the World Development 
Indicators.33 Domestically- sourced investment (as a share of  GDP) is 
calculated as the diﬀerence between gross capital formation and FDI. It 
is immediately evident that these two types of  investment have opposite 
eﬀects. As expected, increased FDI fl ows strongly reduce the pollution 
intensity of  Chinese trade, while increased domestically sourced invest-
ment does the opposite. Because the eﬀects of  FDI fl ows on the size of 
the fragmented sector are captured via the IV estimation, the coeﬃcient 
on the FDI variable actually suggests evidence of  cleaner exports due to 
a change in composition within the fragmented sector (an increase in z∗). 
It may also suggest that foreign investors bring greener technologies than 
their local counterparts, implying an additional favorable technique eﬀect. 
Parallel results for imports (table 11.5, column [4]) are much weaker and 
show no such role for FDI.
Because of the small sample size, we are unable to test for distinct roles 
of investment by source and labor by skill simultaneously. However, some 
evidence suggestive of the importance of both is shown in column (5) of 
table 11.4. In this fi nal regression, we include the ratio of FDI to domesti-
cally sourced investment as well as growth in the ratio of skilled to unskilled 
labor. The latter is proxied by the share of the population with at least senior 
secondary education, relative to the illiterate share.34 The results in column 
(5) of table 11.5 suggest that the pollution intensity of exports is strongly 
reduced by the relative growth of foreign investment and of skilled labor. 
This evidence is consistent with the notion that increased FDI fl ows expands 
the composition of fragmented exports to include cleaner intermediates and 
that more skill- intensive intermediates are cleaner. While the theory would 
suggest both these attributes should be true of imports as well, only the FDI 
results are borne out in table 11.5 (column [5]).35
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11.7   Global Engagement and the Environment
By all accounts, China’s rapid economic growth over the past twenty years 
has been accompanied by severe environmental degradation. While much 
of this deterioration can be attributed to growth in domestic consumption, 
the extent to which China’s environment has been sacrifi ced so that it can 
serve as “the world’s factory” is an important economic and moral question. 
To begin to address this issue, this paper provides new evidence on trends in 
industrial pollution intensity, changes in the pollution intensity of Chinese 
trade, and the infl uence of foreign investment and production fragmentation 
on the pollution content of Chinese exports and imports. Contrary to the 
expectations of many commentators, we fi nd that deeper global engagement 
has reduced the implicit environmental cost of Chinese income growth.
Using oﬃcial Chinese environmental data on air and water pollution from 
MEP, we fi nd that industrial emissions of primary pollutants have slowed 
or fallen over the last decade while trade has grown. Relative to 1995 levels, 
real manufacturing trade increased almost 300 percent by 2005, while annual 
industrial emissions of COD, smoke, and dust declined by 56 percent, 46 
percent, and 40 percent. Industrial emissions of SO2 rose only after 1999, but 
were 17.5 percent higher than 1995 levels by 2005. As noted by Naughton 
(2007, 495), the abatement of waste from large factories has been a relatively 
positive part of China’s environmental record and the stabilization of waste 
while output has grown sharply represents a signifi cant achievement in its 
development.
Using emissions data compiled from Chinese Environment Yearbooks, we 
present new evidence on the pollution intensity of Chinese industrial pro-
duction. Tracking changes in these pollution intensities over time reveals 
surprising trends. Across all four pollutants, we fi nd that the pollution inten-
sity of almost all sectors has fallen since 1995. This fi nding suggests that 
China has benefi ted from a positive “technique eﬀect,” as emissions per real 
dollar of output have fallen across a wide range of industries. Suggestively, a 
review of trends in Chinese trade patterns reveals that China’s trade appears 
to be shifting toward relatively cleaner sectors over time. In particular, the 
share of exports accounted for by textiles and leather products has fallen, 
while the share accounted for by oﬃce and computing and communications 
equipment has grown dramatically. These growth sectors are characterized 
by low air and water pollution intensities and by high shares of processing 
trade, indicating the substantial presence of two- way trade in production 
“fragments.”
Linking the industrial pollution intensities to detailed trade statistics from 
China Customs yields a weighted average pollution intensity for China’s 
manufacturing exports (imports) for each year in the period 1995 to 2005. 
Contrary to popular expectations, which emphasize the migration of dirty 
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industries to poor nations, we fi nd that Chinese exports are less water-
 pollution intensive and generally less air- pollution intensive than Chinese 
imports would be if  produced domestically. Moreover, both Chinese exports 
and imports are becoming cleaner over time. Holding the pollution intensity 
of production constant in a counterfactual experiment, we fi nd that changes 
in the composition of trade over the decade account for some of the trend 
toward cleaner trade, although a substantial share of the decline remains 
attributed to changes in production techniques. Finally, we fi nd that pro-
cessing trade is cleaner than ordinary trade.
The weight of this evidence suggests that the increased concentration of 
Chinese trade in highly fragmented industries has led to composition and 
technique eﬀects that are favorable toward China’s environment. Drawing 
on Copeland and Taylor (1994), we present a simple model of production 
and trade that leads to a reduced form equation for the pollution inten-
sity of Chinese trade. Explicitly incorporating a role for fragmented trade 
yields a set of key determinants of the pollution intensity of trade: Chinese 
domestic factor endowments, foreign investment, the terms of trade, trade 
frictions, per capita real income, and the share of trade in fragmented sectors 
where this share is also infl uenced by the other key determinants. In theory, 
increased FDI infl ows not only increase the size of the fragmented sector 
but also reduce its average pollution intensity.
Econometric evidence from instrumental variables estimation strongly 
supports the role of processing trade in explaining the drop in the pollu-
tion intensity of Chinese exports and imports over time. This suggests that 
there is indeed a favorable composition eﬀect generated by the increased 
importance of fragmentation in Chinese trade. The evidence also suggests 
that, controlling for the size of processing exports, FDI infl ows contribute to 
cleaner exports. This supports the idea that increased FDI may change the 
composition of the fragmented sector itself  toward relatively cleaner inter-
mediate goods and may also bring greener technology to the fragmented 
sector.
In the Five- Year Plan for 2006 to 2010, the Chinese authorities call for a 
reorientation of their economic growth model toward environmental sus-
tainability. How China will achieve the dual goal of economic growth and 
reduced environmental degradation is far from clear. Trade and foreign 
investment has fueled much of China’s trade boom, and so it is natural to 
ask whether China’s unique brand of global engagement needs to be radi-
cally altered to move its development path in the desired direction. The new 
data analyzed in this paper suggests that, at least provisionally, the answer to 
this question is no. Industrial pollution intensity has already stabilized and, 
in many industries, has begun to decline. Looking specifi cally at the bundle 
of goods China trades with the world, we fi nd that, contrary to what might 
have been expected, foreign investment and integration into global produc-
tion networks has reduced the environmental cost of China’s growth.
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36. The four- digit “classes” within each two- digit division remained essentially unchanged. 
There were fewer classes in total in the 2002 classifi cation, largely due to merges of classes 
within the same division.
37. The remaining 2002 division codes were renumbered accordingly. Thus, 1994 division 40 
corresponds to 2002 division 39, 1994 division 41 corresponds to 2002 division 40, and so on.
Appendix
Construction of the Pollution Intensities of Chinese 
Manufacturing Industries, 1995–2004
Data on emissions of COD, SO2, smoke, and dust, as well as the current 
value of output of the sampled enterprises at the industry level, were com-
piled by the authors from the Chinese Environmental Yearbooks (Chinese 
editions) and the China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (dual language, 
2000, 2005, and 2006). Emissions data are originally in tons and output 
in 1,000 current yuan. They are available by the two- digit “divisions” in 
the Chinese industrial classifi cation system for the industrial sector, which 
includes Mining (six divisions); Manufacturing (thirty divisions); and Distri-
bution of Electricity, Water, and Gas (three divisions). Pollution intensities 
were calculated as emissions (in kilos) per thousand real yuan (1995 yuan). 
Output was defl ated using the manufacturing producer price index (China 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues). These pollution intensities are shown 
for Manufacturing and for the Distribution of Electricity, Water, and Gas 
by division (GB/T 4754- 2002), in table 11A.1.
Change in Chinese Industrial Classifi cations
Prior to 2003, Chinese industrial data were classifi ed using GB/T 4754-
 1994. From 2003 onward, industrial data are classifi ed using GB/T 4754-
 2002. In both classifi cations, manufacturing has thirty two- digit “divisions.” 
Using the oﬃcial Chinese concordance, we compared the two classifi cations 
and found only two changes in manufacturing divisions.36 First, the 1994 
division 39 (weapons and ammunition mfg.) became part of 2002 division 
36 (special equipment mfg.).37 We address this change under aggregation 
issues in the following. Second, the 2002 division 43 (waste recycling) was 
added. This division was not part of manufacturing in the previous period. 
Therefore, we dropped it from the analysis.
Aggregation and Missing Data
In the published emissions and output data from 1995 to 2000, several 
divisions are aggregated together. Divisions 13 to 16 are grouped as “Food, 
Beverages and Tobacco,” divisions 35 to 41 are grouped as “Machine, Elec-
tric Machinery & Electronic Equipment Mfg.,” and divisions 44 to 46 are 
grouped as “Production and Supply of Electric Power, Gas, and Water.” To 
disaggregate these grouped data, we fi rst created corresponding groups for 
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38. These two divisions together account for only about 6 percent of manufacturing exports 
in 1995 and about 4 percent in 2000.
the years 2001 to 2004 by summing the appropriate division data. For each 
group, we calculated the average share of emissions of each pollutant attrib-
utable to each division within the group. We then applied these shares to the 
recorded group data in the earlier period. The group’s annual emissions data 
from 1995 to 2000 for each pollutant was multiplied by the corresponding 
average share to derive the missing annual emissions data for each division 
within that group. We followed a similar procedure to derive the missing 
output data for each division within each group.
For example, during 2001 to 2004, Food Production (14) was responsible 
on average, for about 16 percent of annual COD emissions and about 17 
percent of annual output of “Food, Beverages and Tobacco.” Therefore, 
for each year during 1995 to 2000, 16 percent of the recorded COD emis-
sions and 17 percent of the recorded output for that group were allocated 
to Food Production.
This method assumes that the 2001 to 2004 relative trends in emissions of 
each pollutant and in output across divisions within a group apply during 
the earlier period. This is certainly plausible. However, it could mask any 
radical changes in technique or in composition within a group that took 
place in a single year.
Emissions and output data for fi ve divisions during the 1995 to 2000 
period are missing: Clothes, Shoes and Hat Manufacture (18), Timber Pro-
cessing, etc. (20), Furniture Manufacturing (21), Cultural, Educational and 
Sports Articles (24), and Craftwork and Other (42). To fi ll in the missing 
data for the fi rst three, we paired each missing division with a related division 
for which complete data were available: (18) with (17) textiles; (20) with (22) 
papermaking and paper products; (21) with (22). For each pair, we calcu-
lated the average ratio of emissions of each pollutant for the missing division 
relative to the complete division during 2001 to 2004. These ratios were then 
applied to the recorded data for the complete division in the earlier period. 
For each year of 1995 to 2000, we multiplied the complete division’s data 
by these average emissions ratios to derive the annual emissions data for the 
missing division in that pair. We then followed a similar procedure to derive 
the output data for the missing division.
For example, during 2001 to 2004, we found that the ratio of COD emis-
sions for Clothes (18) relative to Textiles (17) averaged about 3.3 percent, 
while the ratio of SO2 emissions averaged about 4.1 percent. Therefore, for 
each year during 1995 to 2000, we assigned values for division (18) COD 
and SO2 emissions that were 3.3 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively, of the 
recorded data for division (17).
We were unable to fi nd a related division to pair with (24) or (42). Therefore, 
these data are missing during 1995 to 2000.38 These missing data essentially 
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39. The data for 2001 to 2004 in table 11A.1 suggest that this omission might bias the water 
pollution intensity of ISIC 36 upward, but its impact on air pollution intensity is unclear.
impact our estimates of the pollution intensity of ISIC 36 (Furniture and 
other manufacturing, not elsewhere specifi ed). Division (24) maps almost 
exclusively to ISIC 36. The classes in division (42) map to several two- digit 
ISIC categories, but mostly to ISIC 36. These two divisions accounted for 76 
percent (47 percent and 29 percent, respectively, of ISIC 36 exports in 1995, 
but declined in importance over the period. By 2000, they accounted for only 
57 percent (45 percent and 12 percent, respectively), while furniture’s share 
had roughly doubled (11 percent to 19 percent). Thus, while the pollution 
intensity of exports of ISIC 36 in our analysis during 1995 to 2000 is based 
nearly exclusively on the pollution intensity of furniture production, any 
bias this may introduce diminishes over these fi ve years.39
Emissions from Township and Village- Level Enterprises (TVIEs)
Emissions data prior to 1998 were recorded only for industrial enter-
prises at the “county level and above.” After the Investigation on Sources of 
Township Industrial Pollution (1997), it was found that township and village 
industrial enterprises (TVIEs) were accounting for a signifi cant and grow-
ing percentage of emissions. Therefore, the emissions data included these 
enterprises from 1998 onward. Because TVIE emissions data are unavailable 
at the sectoral level, the yearly industrial pollution intensities in 1995 to 1997 
do not include TVIEs. Thus, the values for 1995 in table 11A.1 and in table 
11.2 are likely to be understated.
References
Arndt, Sven, and Henryk Kierzkowski. 2001. Fragmentation. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.
Antweiler, Werner, Brian R. Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor. 2001. Is free trade good 
for the environment? American Economic Review 91:877–908.
Cao, G.- Y. 2000. The future population of China: Prospects to 2045 by place of 
residence and by level of education. IR- 00- 026, IIASA, Austria. (http://www.iiasa
.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/IR- 00- 026.pdf).
Chen, Xikang, Leonard Cheng, K. C. Fung, and Lawrence Lau. 2008. The estima-
tion of domestic value added and employment induced by exports: An application 
to Chinese exports to the US. In China and Asia: Economic and fi nancial inter-
actions, ed. Y. Cheung and K. Wong, 64–82. Oxford, UK: Routledge.
Chow, Gregory. 2006. New capital estimates for China: Comments. China Economic 
Review 17:186–92.
China Environment Yearbook. Various issues. Beijing: China Environmental Science 
Press.
China Statistical Yearbook. Various issues. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
468    Judith M. Dean and Mary E. Lovely
China Statistical Yearbook on Environment. 2006. Beijing: National Bureau of Sta-
tistics and Ministry of Environmental Protection.
Copeland, Brian R., and M. Scott Taylor. 1994. North- South trade and the environ-
ment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:755–87.
———. 2003. Trade and the environment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
———. 2004. Trade, growth and the environment. Journal of Economic Literature 
42:7–71.
Dean, Judith, ed. 2001. International trade and the environment. The International 
Library of  Environmental Economics and Policy Series. Aldershot, UK: Ash-
gate.
Dean, Judith. 2002. Does trade liberalization harm the environment? A new test. 
Canadian Journal of Economics 34:819–42.
Dean, Judith, K. C. Fung, and Zhi Wang. 2008. How vertically specialized is Chinese 
trade? USITC Working Paper no. 2008- 09D. Washington, DC: United States 
International Trade Commission.
Dean, Judith, Mary E. Lovely, and Hua Wang. 2009. Are foreign investors attracted 
to weak environmental regulations: Evaluating the evidence from China. Journal 
of Development Economics 90:1–13.
Ederington, Josh, Arik Levinson, and Jenny Minier. 2004. Trade liberalization and 
pollution havens. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 4 (6): 1–22.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 1996. Foreign investment, outsourc-
ing, and relative wages. In Political economy of trade policy: Essays in honor of 
Jagdish Bhagwati, ed. R. C. Feenstra, G. M. Grossman, and D. A. Irwin, 89–127. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gardner, Timothy. 2008. Rich world behind much of global pollution. Reuters, Octo-
ber 21. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N21532488.htm.
Henley, John, Colin Kirkpatrick, and Georgina Wilde. 1999. Foreign direct invest-
ment in China: Recent trends and current policy issues. World Economy 22:
223–43.
Holz, Carsten A. 2006. New capital estimates for China. China Economic Review 
17:142–85.
Koopman, Robert, Zhi Wang, and Shang- Jin Wei. 2008. How much of  Chinese 
exports are really made in China. NBER Working Paper no. 14109. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lardy, Nicholas R. 1994. China in the world economy. Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
Levinson, Arik. 2009. Technology, international trade, and pollution from U.S. 
manufacturing. American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Ministry of  Environmental Protection (MEP). 2006. Environmental protection in 
China 1996–2005. Beijing: Information Oﬃce of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China. http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Jun/170355.htm.
———. 2007. Report on the state of the environment in China 2006. Beijing: Informa-
tion Oﬃce of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. http://english
.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/soe/soe2006/200711/t20071105_112560.htm.
Naughton, Barry. 2007. The Chinese economy: Transitions and growth. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2005. Gover-
nance in China. Paris: OECD.
Ping, Xin- Qiao. 2005. Vertical specialization, value added, and the US- China trade 
relationship. China Center for Economic Research Working Paper no. C2005005. 
Beijing: CCER.
Trade Growth, Production Fragmentation, and China’s Environment    469
Robison, H. David. 1988. Industrial pollution abatement: The impact on balance of 
trade. Canadian Journal of Economics 21:187–99.
Walter, Ingo. 1973. The pollution content of  American trade. Western Economic 
Journal, 11:61–70.
World Bank. 2001. China: Air, land, and water. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Trade Organization (WTO). 2006. Trade policy review: People’s Republic of 
China. Geneva, Switzerland: WTO.
Zhang, Shuguang, Yansheng Zhang, and Zhongxin Wan. 1998. The costs of protec-
tion in China. Washington, DC: IIE.
Comment Arik Levinson
Dean and Lovely’s chapter makes an important and interesting contribu-
tion to our understanding of the relationship between international trade 
and pollution. Many observers argue that developed countries, such as the 
United States, have improved their environments in recent decades largely 
by outsourcing pollution- intensive production to developing countries, such 
as China.1 If  that is the case, U.S. imports and Chinese exports should be 
increasingly composed of pollution- intensive goods. Economists have now 
refuted that idea, from the U.S. perspective, by showing that the composition 
of U.S. imports has become less pollution- intensive over time, not more.2 
Dean and Lovely are the fi rst I know of to examine the converse. They show 
that the composition of exports from China has been shifting toward cleaner 
goods, not dirtier.
The result nicely complements existing evidence from the U.S. perspective 
and is, therefore, both important and believable. However, the analysis con-
tains two unavoidable biases that unfortunately work in favor of that result, 
making the composition of China’s exports appear spuriously cleaner. Dean 
and Lovely acknowledge both biases clearly in their chapter and explain 
convincingly that they have exhausted all possibilities for ameliorating those 
biases given the available data. It is, therefore, worth taking a few moments 
here to demonstrate with the U.S. data just how large those biases can be.
The fi rst bias involves industry aggregation. Dean and Lovely calculate 
emissions intensities (pollution per thousand yuan of output) for each of 
thirty- three sectors, listed in their appendix table 11A.1. They then conduct 
a counterfactual thought experiment, constructing the aggregate pollu-
Arik Levinson is an associate professor of  economics at Georgetown University, and a 
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1. See, for example, Jane Spencer, “Why China Could Blame Its CO2 on West,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 12, 2007, A.2.
2. In addition to work cited by Dean and Lovely, see Kahn (2003), Cole (2004), and Gamper-
 Rabindran (2006).
